Enron Mail

From:richard.sage@enron.com
To:richard.causey@enron.com, rick.buy@enron.com
Subject:
Cc:john.sherriff@enron.com, michael.brown@enron.com, fernley.dyson@enron.com,sally.beck@enron.com, ted.murphy@enron.com, brent.price@enron.com
Bcc:john.sherriff@enron.com, michael.brown@enron.com, fernley.dyson@enron.com,sally.beck@enron.com, ted.murphy@enron.com, brent.price@enron.com
Date:Thu, 31 Aug 2000 01:51:00 -0700 (PDT)

Rick, Rick,

There are three MG offices in North America outside New York which, previous
to the acquisition by Enron, acted much as trading offices. They are very
small.
We have worked with the people in Metals to put in place extra controls so
that they are not trading offices, for example having a trader in a
designated Trading Office own each book and sign off on profit daily.
This process has highlighted the fact that our non-trading offices are not
all the same, and cannot reasonably all be the same.
Some offices organise logistics things to happen on the ground, some
originate (get a price from a Trading Office for every deal), and some
execute for Trading Offices (are given a range within which they can execute
trades).

is a suggestion for how we can make this division explicit.
Tab 'Office Models' shows which functions are performed in which type of
office
Tab 'Office List' shows the actual offices involved
We propose to re-examine this methodology in 6 months' time.
Buy-in has been obtained from the cc list and the people on the ground.

It is worth noting that this approach would have caught Helsinki, except for
the Contract-in-a-bottom-drawer, but no system of control can reliably catch
that, as was evidenced by EOTT.

Are you both happy with this approach?
Are there any extra controls you would like to see in place?

Thanks,
Richard