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From:ann.schmidt@enron.com
To:mark.palmer@enron.com, meredith.philipp@enron.com, karen.denne@enron.com,steven.kean@enron.com
Subject:Deregulation Articles
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Date:Fri, 15 Sep 2000 01:38:00 -0700 (PDT)

F.Y.I.

PG&E Presses to End Freeze That Keeps
Power Costs Low in Northern California
By Rebecca Smith

09/15/2000
The Wall Street Journal
Page A3
(Copyright © 2000, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)

California's largest utility is pushing to end a four-year-old retail rate
freeze that has
insulated millions of Northern Californians from the volatile wholesale
electricity prices that
have rocked San Diego this summer.

PG&E Corp., parent of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. in San Francisco, said it
wants to end
the freeze imposed in 1996 by the state legislature as soon as possible,
because it is
losing money under the arrangement. In a filing with the Securities and
Exchange
Commission, PG&E said it has collected $2.2 billion less from customers
this summer
than it has shelled out to buy bulk power for them from the
state-sanctioned California
Power Exchange, a central auction.

PG&E's disclosure sets the stage for a major confrontation between the
utility and
regulators. It will be up to the California Public Utilities Commission to
balance conflicting
needs: the utility's desire to protect its shareholders from potentially
huge losses, and the
commission's own duty, as regulator, to protect the public from a flawed
market that
appears incapable of delivering the "just and reasonable" rates required by
law. Legislators
now say they fear the state could be tipped into a recession if electricity
prices don't drop
soon.

Under the state's 1996 deregulation law, all California investor-owned
utilities were allowed
to freeze rates at what seemed like high levels. Utilities were permitted
to use surplus
revenues to pay down generation-related debts that regulators said would
render them
uncompetitive in a deregulated world. It worked well until this summer.
PG&E charged
customers, on average, $54 for each megawatt hour of electricity supplied
even though it
paid only $26 and $31 a megawatt hour, respectively, for that power in 1998
and 1999. By
June 30, it had collected enough surplus money to cancel $6.2 billion of
debts.

But the situation went haywire this summer as wholesale power prices
lurched upward. The
utility paid an average price of $163 a megawatt hour for electricity in
June, $110 in July and
$187 in August. Prices may be higher yet this month. The average price of
power to be
consumed today, for example, is $200 a megawatt hour, or nearly four times
the amount
that PG&E can bill its customers.

Until recently, it was assumed that the utility would be able to recapture,
in times of weaker
demand, any shortfall that occurred in high-priced summer months. But that
is looking less
and less certain. Power prices projected for coming months look higher than
the $54 a
megawatt hour that PG&E now charges, particularly with natural-gas prices
roughly triple
the price of two to three years ago. The latter pushes up generating costs
at natural
gas-fired plants. Another problem is that there is less power available to
be imported from
outside California. In fact, the Pacific Northwest is expected to run short
of power this
winter, with less water available than in recent years for hydroelectric
generation, putting
pressure on California's market right when plants normally are taken out of
service for
maintenance.

PG&E's chief financial officer now says he sees no reason to prolong the
pain. He wants
the freeze ended or he wants protection from high wholesale prices. "People
did not
envision the situation we have today," says Peter Darbee. Yesterday,
Moody's Investors
Service Inc. issued a negative outlook on PG&E, Edison International and
their big utilities,
citing the "increased supply risk" assumed by the utilities and "the
unsettled state of
electric deregulation in California."

But state officials are loath to let consumers feel today's market
volatility. Knowing that,
PG&E may seek to strike a bargain in which it would continue some sort of
rate freeze in
exchange for permission to recoup some of the money it has lost. But there
is no provision
for that under current state law. The law simply says that when the
utilities have paid down
certain categories of costs, the freeze ends. If they haven't paid down
these debts by March
31, 2002, it ends anyway, and they have to swallow any loss.

The wild card is what will happen with PG&E's 4,000-megawatt hydroelectric
network, the
biggest such system in North America. The utility has offered to shave $2.8
billion from the
tally of debts billed to ratepayers, if it is allowed to move its
powerhouses and dams into
the hands of an unregulated affilate. Such a move would end the rate freeze
since the
proceeds would be more than enough to offset the amount PG&E says it is
otherwise
entitled to collect from ratepayers, some $1.6 billion.

But so long as power prices are volatile, nobody really wants the freeze to
end but PG&E.

In its SEC filing, the company said that it has no reason to believe, at
the current time, that
it will be able to recover lost monies and said it may be "required to
write off the
unrecoverable portion as a one-time charge against earnings" -- potentially
amounting to
billions of dollars. The same scenario exists for Edison International's
Southern California
Edison Co. unit, which serves most of the lower third of the state and has
run a deficit of
roughly $1 billion this summer.

Observers say both utilities are wary of inciting consumer anger, should
they be too
aggressive in lobbying for an end to the freeze. A case in point: In
hearings before federal
energy regulators on Tuesday, Steve Baum, chairman of Sempra Energy, owner
of San
Diego 's utility, said the company's utility trucks are being defaced and
workers are being
intimidated by customers who are furious about power bills that have
doubled and tripled
since June. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. is the only utility, thus far, to
end its rate freeze
and pass wholesale power costs directly through to customers.

State Sen. Debra Bowen, chairwoman of the California Senate utilities
committee, said the
legislature is reluctant to become involved. She said the legislature
"feels like somebody
who's fallen into poison oak enough times that all we have to do is walk
past a bush and we
break out in a rash. That's the way we react to these energy issues now."




Copyright , 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.





Business/Financial Desk; Section C
A Dwindling Faith In Deregulation
New Ways to Harness Electricity
By NEELA BANERJEE

09/15/2000
The New York Times
Page 1, Column 2
c. 2000 New York Times Company

Over a few sultry days in the summer of 1997, the state of Wisconsin got an
early taste of
the electricity shortages that now threaten several other regions of the
country. An
unusually large number of nuclear plants that supply the northern Midwest
were closed for
maintenance just as an unexpected heat wave drifted into the area.
Wisconsin Electric,
which serves Milwaukee, shut off electricity to 80 businesses; every few
hours, it
beseeched consumers to limit their energy use.

Wisconsin Electric averted blackouts, but the scare profoundly changed the
state's
approach to deregulating the power industry, a process it had begun to
explore only a year
earlier. Like many other utilities, Wisconsin Electric initially pushed for
what it and others
called the Big Bang: state regulators giving up control over the production
and pricing of
electricity almost immediately.

But after the 1997 power shortage, Wisconsin Electric, along with most
local businesses
and consumer advocacy groups, began to support a go-slow approach to
deregulation, first
building in an extra margin of reliable power before encouraging the state
to remove its
decades-old grip on the electricity industry.

Lately, the rest of the country has been drawing the same conclusion. Just
like Wisconsin,
several other states have lost their early faith in the instantaneous,
smooth creation of a
free and fair electricity market. Deregulation has faltered as surging
consumer demand
outstrips the supply of electricity, and regulators and utilities scramble
to cope with
successive summers of price volatility and power failures.

More than a year ago, the wholesale price of electricity charged by power
plants in the
Midwest surged to $6,000 a megawatt-hour, compared with average costs of
$21 to $22 for
the same amount of power. Con Ed customers in New York paid 43 percent more
for
electricity this June than last year. Prices have spiked elsewhere as well.

And when rolling blackouts rippled through Silicon Valley and electricity
bills doubled in
San Diego over several weeks this summer, California's pioneering approach
to
deregulation came to embody what many see as the failings of the process.

Despite the second thoughts about deregulation, few experts expect a return
to the days of
strict government control. A world in which various power generators
compete openly to
provide electricity at market prices still offers the prospect of both
lower costs for business
and consumers and higher profits for utilities than is possible under the
traditional, more
inefficient system in which monopoly suppliers are supervised by government
regulators.

''California is an indication to the rest of us that we need to do our
homework to make
deregulation work,'' said Dick Olson, legal counsel with the Wisconsin
Industrial Energy
Group, an association of large companies. ''Some people want to stop the
process, but the
genie is out of the bottle.''

But getting from here to there is proving far more difficult than expected.
Lacking a clear
federal approach, states are finding their own way and, in the process,
casting doubt on
some early promises.

''Deregulation was definitely oversold to consumers by many people,'' said
Severin
Borenstein, director of the Energy Institute at the University of
California at Berkeley. ''To
economists and a few others, deregulation was a calculated experiment, and
we knew it
would have its costs.''

Historically, a regional electric utility, which was owned by investors and
regulated by the
state, generated power, transmitted it over high-voltage lines and then
distributed it in
low-voltage form into homes and businesses. In broad terms, deregulation
calls for
separating generation, transmission and distribution into distinct
businesses.

Deregulation advocates argued that if power plants were sold to private
owners, they would
compete among themselves to sell power to transmission and distribution
companies at
cheaper prices, driving down the cost of electricity. But that outcome was
predicated on the
realities of the mid-1990's, when power plants had spare capacity.

But with few power plants coming on line recently, particularly in
California and the
Northeast, deregulation was introduced in the late 1990's at the worst
possible time. In the
thriving economy, businesses demanded more electricity, and people built
bigger homes
and bought more gadgets, sharply narrowing the gap between available
supplies of
electricity and peak demand. Fuel for generation has also become more
expensive,
especially natural gas, whose price has doubled even as it has grown
increasingly popular
because it is cleaner than other fuels.

''I think that the expectation that deregulation will always give you lower
prices is
unrealistic,'' said John B. Ramil, president of the Tampa Electric Company,
a unit of TECO
Energy Inc. ''Consumers think that competition will lead to lower prices
automatically, when
actually they will be paying market prices for power.''

Advocates rallied support for electricity deregulation by asserting that it
would deliver the
choice and the low prices that deregulation of telecommunications has
brought. But they
forgot that the restructuring of the telephone industry, like power
deregulation now, angered
consumers early on, when local calling rates rose and the proliferation of
choices baffled
many people. Lawmakers and regulators took years to iron out the process,
which is still
going on. And because electricity is even more vital than telephones, there
is far less
tolerance for interruptions in service and volatile prices.

''You can't assume that you can deregulate in one year and sit back and
watch how things
work,'' said Barry Abramson, senior utility analyst with PaineWebber.
''Regulators and utility
officials have to come back frequently and correct problems they never
expected until the
system gets it right.''

Seeing an Example In Pennsylvania

So far, 24 states have tried some form of deregulation, but regulators and
utilities in other
regions say changes in their local electricity industry are inevitable, too.

Among states where deregulation has occurred, Pennsylvania has emerged so
far as the
place where the promises of competition and lower prices are being met most
successfully.
The state began to draw up a deregulation blueprint in 1996, around the
same time
California did, driven by electric rates in Philadelphia and other major
cities double the
average in the United States.

But Pennsylvania opted for a plan that calls for substantial government
involvement in the
market at every step. The state protected the utilities against losses from
their older plants;
in return utilities had to agree to freeze rates until 2006 at 1997 levels
to protect
consumers.

The state aggressively advertised a choice of new electricity providers.
More important, it
set the benchmark generation rates for traditional utilities at a fairly
high level, which made
some outside competitors' prices look favorable in comparison and which
spurred
consumers to choose new power providers.

As a result, more than 528,000 residential and business users, about 10
percent of the
total, have switched to other providers that sell them power at a fixed
price over long
periods. A recent study by the State of Pennsylvania estimated that
consumers have saved
about $2.84 billion in energy costs over the last three years.

As consumers sought new power providers, those same companies began to
build new
plants in and near Pennsylvania, shoring up electricity reliability in the
area. About 19,000
megawatts of power, adding 50 percent more capacity, are expected to come
on line in
Pennsylvania in the next five years.

Pennsylvania also cobbled together the independent system operator PJM from
a network
of neighboring states that could transmit power easily to one another,
creating a grid third in
size behind the entire transmission systems of France and of Japan.

Trying Rate Caps In California

Yet the lurching progress of deregulation in the country as a whole and the
loss of old
certainties like reliable power at steady prices have ignited a popular
backlash in many
areas, most vividly in California. There, the state has decided to cap
rates in San Diego at
1999 levels for the next two years. Other Californians have urged a
rollback of deregulation,
demanding that power plants sold to private owners be placed under
government control
again.

The widespread short supply of electricity and the peculiarities of the
commodity itself have
given generation companies enormous leverage in the marketplace. Unlike
most other
goods, electricity cannot be stored to be used when there is a shortage.
Nor is it something
consumers can do without, which means the companies that supply people with
electricity
will pay just about any price to keep the lights on.

Most analysts say that the exercise of such influence is not illegal --nor
unexpected --
since companies can be expected to try to maximize their profits. But
California's complex
power buying mechanism has created a situation in which relatively small
players have
extraordinary influence.

On June 14, for example, the temperature in San Francisco hit 103 degrees
and heat
records were broken all over the Bay Area. The state's Independent System
Operator,
which coordinates transmission of electricity, predicted that during peak
use on that
weekday afternoon, California would need 43,000 megawatts. But reports from
the power
plants working that day showed only 36,000 megawatts available. As a
result, the California
I.S.O. paid $1,500 a megawatt to various plants that were not running; some
of those plants
had bet on a shortage and delayed generation until the price of power
reached the cap.

''The world knows we'll make up that energy shortfall somewhere,'' said
Spence Gerber,
director of settlements at the I.S.O. ''People go in and make their bids
knowing we're not
going to shut the lights off. We have no choice.''

In California, rate freezes have prevented most utilities from passing on
much of the higher
price of power to consumers. In San Diego , however, the rate freezes were
lifted just as
the city strained under a heat wave. That led to the doubling of customers'
bills in the span
of a month.

One part of any long-term solution, experts say, is to increase the supply
of electricity,
through building new power plants and transmission lines. But few
communities want power
plants or transmission towers on their turf, adding to delays.

So far, states have relied on caps on the wholesale price of power to keep
costs down. In
California, the price cap, until recently, was $750 a megawatt, and in
Pennsylvania, it is
$1,000. But California officials concede that power plants sometimes get
$1,500 a
megawatt-hour -- $750 for being on standby and $750 for the power itself.

Caps, if set too low, may dissuade companies from producing electricity and
from building
new power plants. ''If you fix caps at $250, you have to realize that if in
a neighboring state
someone is offering $251 for power, you will have a serious shortage,''
said Richard Priory,
chairman of Duke Energy, a nationwide power generation and trading company.

Given the complexities, deregulation, with its connotation of a
laissez-faire management of
an industry, seems a misnomer. The focus is now on reorganizing the
electricity industry,
rather than cutting it loose, and of using sophisticated forms of
regulation to foster
competition and efficiency.

''What we're looking at is re-regulation, regulation in a different manner
than we had before,''
said Douglas Hale, senior economist with the Energy Information
Administration in
Washington. ''Electricity is not one of those commodities that you can walk
away from and
let take care of itself. You need a central authority to make sure it
doesn't all come
crashing down.''

In Wisconsin, rather than having the legislature adopt an overall plan, the
central state
authority has moved to revamp the transmission sector before tackling
generation, the
reverse of what most other states have done. The Midwest price spikes in
1998 revealed
that while neighboring states were willing to provide power, there were not
enough
transmission lines in Wisconsin to bring it in. As a result, the Wisconsin
government has
compelled the state's four major utilities to surrender operation of their
transmission lines to
the Midwest Independent System Operator, which covers several states, to
make sure all
companies have equal access to power lines.

''The problem with the big bang in an industry like ours is that you take a
large risk,'' said
Larry Salustro, senior vice president of Wisconsin Electric. ''Maybe in
three years, the
market will be better. But in those three years, people will go through
difficult personal and
financial times.''

The transmission company will be responsible for building new lines to
improve the
importing of power, and though they own shares in the concern, no single
utility controls it.
Wisconsin plans to double transmission capacity in the next four or five
years, by which
time the state would be ready to deregulate generation.

''You won't have low prices unless you create an effective market
structure,'' said Lee
Cullen, counsel for Customers First, a Wisconsin consumer advocacy group.
''Everybody
can support competition as a superior system, but we're not rushing
headlong into it.''

Building safeguards against the volatility deregulation brings will clearly
take years, as more
generation -- mostly in small natural-gas-fired power plants -- starts up,
as more power lines
are built to move electricity to where it is needed most and as business
and consumers
respond to higher prices by finding ways to conserve power and limit use
during peak
periods.

Some businesses and the occasional residential customer have set up links
with their
utilities to respond to electricity prices in real time, by turning down
lights or allowing air-
conditioning to shut down briefly when a computer message informs them of
price spikes.
So far, however, such operations are rare.

''Until consumers can see and respond to real-time prices, price caps will
remain a
necessary evil,'' Mr. Borenstein said. ''The dirty secret of restructuring
is that it is replacing
old forms of regulation with new ones.''

Photos: Lee Cullen is a lawyer for Customers First, a Wisconsin consumer
advocacy
group. He stands outside the switching station and coal yard of Madison Gas
and Electric
in Madison, Wis. (Andy Manis for The New York Times)(pg. C4); Individual
states are trying
to find answers to the problem of deregulating the electricity industry.
Power lines in
Wisconsin, left, are symbols of a state that is trying to revamp the
transmission sector. In
Pennsylvania, where a power plant is being built in Lebanon, below, the
government is
involved with the market at every step. (John Zeedick for The New York
Times); (John Saller
for The New York Times)(pg. C1) Chart/Graph: ''Shocks to The System'' In
deregulated
electricity markets, prices have been far more volatile than expected, at
times jumping to
extraordinary levels during shortages. *Volume-weighted wholesale spot
prices for on-peak,
next-day delivery of a megawatt-hour of electricity. (Source: Bloomberg
Financial Markets;
Cambridge Energy Research Associates)(pg. C1) ''Approaching Electricity
Deregulation
More Cautiously'' As some states struggle with tight supplies and high
prices, others are
moving more slowly on deregulation. Graph tracks supply and demand since
1980. Map
tracks Deregulation by state. (Sources: Edison Electric Institute; North
American Electric
Reliability Council; Energy Information Administration)(pg. C4)




Copyright , 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.








Metro; Letters Desk
Bidding Rules Costly for Electric Rates

09/15/2000
Los Angeles Times
Home Edition
Page B-8
Copyright 2000 / The Times Mirror Company

* Re "Davis Walks a Political Tightrope on Energy Prices," Sept. 12: The
deregulation of the California utilities
didn't include a change in the strangling bidding rules to which these
utilities, unfortunately, are bound. They are
required to buy their power through a state-sponsored day-ahead market,
rather than being allowed to bid on
longer-range contracts on the free market, which would permit them to lock
in lower pricing.

The California Legislature wanted to retain controls on pricing, thinking
it would result in the lowest costs. Well,
the legislators were wrong! The real damage is that the public now believes
energy price increases were due to
deregulation, but in fact the utilities still aren't deregulated enough to
permit freedom of bidding. Take the reins off
the bidding prices, and prices will come down.

JAN WINNING

West Hills

*

Why do the state taxpayers have to pay to keep San Diego residents'
electric bills down to $68 a month? Either
the power providers are ripping the people off, or they have had really
cheap electricity because San Diego Gas &
Electric didn't invest enough in increasing power-generating capacity.

They could shut off the air conditioning and probably keep their bill that
low. My parents never had any air
conditioning, and they lived where it got over 100 degrees every year. In a
lot of cases we would be better off
without it, just not as comfortable. There is no constitutional right or
guarantee that we have to have air
conditioning or cheap electricity. It sounds like a good time to start
conserving.

KEN WALTERS

Apple Valley




Copyright , 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.