Enron Mail

From:rebecca.cantrell@enron.com
To:james.steffes@enron.com, jennifer.thome@enron.com, steven.kean@enron.com,leslie.lawner@enron.com
Subject:NGI Article on Testimony in El Paso Case
Cc:
Bcc:
Date:Mon, 14 May 2001 04:29:00 -0700 (PDT)

Leslie asked me to forward this. Summary of FERC staff testimony is in red.

NGI's Daily Gas Price Index
published : May 14, 2001
FERC Staff Finds Market Power Concerns in El Paso Case
El Paso Natural Gas and El Paso Merchant Energy probably exercised market
power in the Southern California gas market and drove up gas prices over the
past year when pipeline capacity constraints existed, FERC staff concluded
last week in testimony before Chief Administrative Law Judge Curtis Wagner
Jr.
At the same time Southern California Edison told FERC that El Paso caused a
$3.7 billion increase in gas costs in California from March 2000 to March
2001 by withholding capacity from the market and driving up the basis
differentials between supply basins and California. Edison based its
testimony on analysis by the Brattle Group.
Meanwhile, El Paso countered with its own data arsenal and army of
consultants. El Paso said the price increases were caused by unprecedented
demand and inadequate supply infrastructure. Harvard University economics
professor Joseph Kalt said on behalf of El Paso that the exorbitant gas
prices were the result of a combination of supply and demand factors related
to the electricity market and ultimately caused by decades of bad public
policy decisions rather than El Paso's market power in the Southwest.
FERC set the market power issue for hearing in March before Judge Wagner and
ordered him to provide an initial decision within 60 days (see Daily GPI,
March 29). The Commission cleared El Paso of charges that it rigged the
bidding for capacity on its system during an open season in February 2000 to
favor its affiliates. Critics alleged El Paso Merchant Energy Gas L.P. and El
Paso Merchant Energy Co. ended up the big winners in the open season, snaring
three contracts for 1.22 Bcf/d of firm capacity on El Paso to the California
border, because they received inside information on a discount transportation
rate. But in the order on complaint, the Commission said it found "no merit
in the allegations." Moreover, it said there was no evidence that El Paso
violated its standards of conduct. However, the allegations that El Paso
engaged in market and price manipulation were not dismissed.
In his testimony last week, FERC economist Dr. Jonathan D. Ogur concluded
that under certain circumstances El Paso was able to wield market power in
the Southern California gas market. Its market position as measured by the
Herfindahl-Herschman Index (HHI) exceeded levels deemed appropriate by FERC,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department, he said.
When the state is considered as a single market, El Paso's market
concentration and market share are "both within the safe harbor," he said.
However, when there are capacity constraints in Southern California, as there
were last summer and winter, and when El Paso's supplies include both firm
and "nearly firm" gas, the HHI increases to 2,262, said Ogur. "This exceeds
the 1,800 threshold for concern that sellers may possess market power. El
Paso's market share rises to 45%, which exceeds the 35% threshold.
"When pipeline constraints separate Southern California from Northern
California, market concentration may be outside the safe harbor and El Paso's
market share may be greater than the threshold," he said.
Although about 1 Bcf/d of excess capacity may have existed in the Northern
California market last summer, it's not clear that it was available to
Southern California customers in sufficient quantities to constrain El Paso's
market power, said Ogur.
Ogur's testimony differs substantially from testimony submitted last week by
John Morris for El Paso Merchant and testimony submitted by Lukens Consulting
for El Paso Pipeline. Those studies defined the market in question as
including all of California, while Ogur defined the relevant market as
Southern California when pipeline constraints exist.
The Brattle Study, which was submitted on behalf of Southern California
Edison, concludes El Paso Merchant Energy was able to exercise market power
through its control over 1.4 Bcf/d of firm capacity on El Paso Pipeline and
Transwestern, but the study does not specifically define the market. It
places an HHI of 2,179 for firm capacity held by El Paso Merchant on El Paso
and Transwestern between the San Juan Basin in New Mexico and California. The
Brattle study calculates El Paso's market share to be 34%, rising to 48%
after adjusting for Southern California Gas' and PG&E's core capacity.
The study fails, according to Ogur, by excluding capacity on other California
pipes and storage space. It also attempts to find market power abuse by
analyzing basis differentials that exceeded maximum tariff rates, but admits
it is unable to determine if the abnormal basis differentials might have been
caused instead by capacity constraints. It also can't deny the fact that
interruptible transportation was available at maximum rates.