Enron Mail

From:steven.kean@enron.com
To:elizabeth.labanowski@enron.com
Subject:AG letter - privileged and confidential: request for legal advice.
Cc:elizabeth.linnell@enron.com
Bcc:elizabeth.linnell@enron.com
Date:Mon, 9 Jul 2001 02:56:00 -0700 (PDT)

The letter looks good. A couple of comments for your consideration:

On page three we describe the change to the definition of Public Utility and
then argue that we don't fit into it. Would it be worth explaining why that
makes sense? Specifically, the New Jersey restructuring law, like most
efforts of its kind in other markets, is designed to separate the competitive
from monopoly elements of the power (and gas) businesses. Economic
regulation would then be restricted to the remaining monopoly elements of the
business (eg distribution). The competitive market can not be solely relied
upon to "regulate" the behavior of monopoly asset owners, such as
distribution utilities. Therefore, regulators continue to be called upon to
set pricing and other terms of service. What those regulators decide matters
a great deal to those monopoly utilities and it consequently makes sense for
lawmakers to be concerned about attempts by such entities to use campaign
contributions to tacitly influence decision makers. The same public policies
simply do not apply to that portion of the market which is competitive. The
generation and sales business has a competitive structure (i.e. relatively
low barriers to entry, multiple competitors etc.). These components of the
power and gas business can be "regulated" by the market with respect to rates
and terms of service. They do not require economic regulation any more than
grocery stores, department stores, appliance sellers or other "retailers"
(who presumably are not prohibited from making contributions. Competition
and markets discipline behavior and establish competitive prices and terms of
service. Because regulators don't set the prices and terms of service for
such sellers, there is no reason to be concerned about campaign
contribuitions from such organizations. Indeed, the legislation, and the
legislative history, clearly conform to this underlying policy rationale.
As a former practicing lawyer, I certainly understand the value of pleading
in the alternative. But, I question how certain of our arguments woud be
perceived by the public if they ever came to light (which these documents
have a habit of doing).. . I can just see the press seizing on Enron's claim
of "ignorance or mistake" or the fact that we pled for the favorable exercise
of "prosecutorial discretion". I suggest that we add whatever we feel is
necessary to the very solid looking intent argument, not make specific
reference to "ignorance or mistake", and not plead for the favorable
esxercise of PD. If we feel we need to write about this last item, perhaps
we could suggest that it would be a waste of the public's resources to pursue
a claim under such circumstances.