Questions you requested

Joshua:

I found the Enron staff who have had the conversations with the Oregon PUC so
believe the attached Q&A meet your request. If you need additional
materials, just let me know.

In addition, EPSA sent some questions they would like the Senator to ask of
any of the EPSA witnesses (Reliant, Calpine, Williams, or Enron) dealing with
the Impact of the Recent changes in the Management of the California
Independent System Operator:

Background: The Cal ISO acts as the "air traffic controller" for the
interstate electric power grid in California. The ISO determines who gets
access to the grid and under what terms and conditions. It is the ISO that
helps ensure that access to the grid is truly open and non-discriminatory.
When the ISO was initially constituted several years ago, a "stakeholder"
management board was created that represented a wide range of market
interests---power sellers, generators, consumers, political leaders, etc.
After the power emergencies began last summer, this board was criticized as
too splintered and indecisive. In a response to this perception and in an
effort to impose greater control over the ISO, the California state
legislature replaced the stakeholder board with a five-person board that
serves at the request of the California Governor.

QUESTION: The Cal ISO has recently seen its management board changed from
one with broad stakeholder representation to one appointed by the California
Governor. Given that California is a critical part of a larger western
regional power market, how can we ensure that regional power needs are
reflected in the decisions of the new state appointed Board?

ANSWER: We really can't. Most of the time, the Board has a limited role.
However, the "traffic controller" role becomes crucial when the power crunch
comes. Every market participant needs to be worried that, during times of
real power emergencies, the Cal ISO Board will be too willing to shoot first
and ask questions later. Companies with firm transactions involving
out-of-state entities may find their needs and commercial interests
sacrificed to prevent local political problems. Instead of robust,
competitive regional markets, politicizing transmission decisions practically
guarantees an increasingly balkanized market.