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Enron Mail |
The letter looks good. A couple of comments for your consideration:
On page three we describe the change to the definition of Public Utility an= d then argue that we don't fit into it. Would it be worth explaining why t= hat makes sense? Specifically, the New Jersey restructuring law, like most= efforts of its kind in other markets, is designed to separate the competit= ive from monopoly elements of the power (and gas) businesses. Economic reg= ulation would then be restricted to the remaining monopoly elements of the = business (eg distribution). The competitive market can not be solely relie= d upon to "regulate" the behavior of monopoly asset owners, such as distrib= ution utilities. Therefore, regulators continue to be called upon to set p= ricing and other terms of service. What those regulators decide matters a = great deal to those monopoly utilities and it consequently makes sense for = lawmakers to be concerned about attempts by such entities to use campaign c= ontributions to tacitly influence decision makers. The same public policie= s simply do not apply to that portion of the market which is competitive. = The generation and sales business has a competitive structure (i.e. relativ= ely low barriers to entry, multiple competitors etc.). These components of= the power and gas business can be "regulated" by the market with respect t= o rates and terms of service. They do not require economic regulation any = more than grocery stores, department stores, appliance sellers or other "re= tailers" (who presumably are not prohibited from making contributions. Com= petition and markets discipline behavior and establish competitive prices a= nd terms of service. Because regulators don't set the prices and terms of = service for such sellers, there is no reason to be concerned about campaign= contribuitions from such organizations. Indeed, the legislation, and the = legislative history, clearly conform to this underlying policy rationale. As a former practicing lawyer, I certainly understand the value of pleading= in the alternative. But, I question how certain of our arguments woud be = perceived by the public if they ever came to light (which these documents h= ave a habit of doing).. . I can just see the press seizing on Enron's clai= m of "ignorance or mistake" or the fact that we pled for the favorable exer= cise of "prosecutorial discretion". I suggest that we add whatever we feel= is necessary to the very solid looking intent argument, not make specific = reference to "ignorance or mistake", and not plead for the favorable esxerc= ise of PD. If we feel we need to write about this last item, perhaps we co= uld suggest that it would be a waste of the public's resources to pursue a = claim under such circumstances.
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