Enron Mail

From:kristin.walsh@enron.com
To:john.lavorato@enron.com, louise.kitchen@enron.com
Subject:California Update #2, 2/23/01
Cc:phillip.allen@enron.com, mike.grigsby@enron.com, heizenrader@home.com,mark.tawney@enron.com, claudio.ribeiro@enron.com, rob.milnthorp@enron.com
Bcc:phillip.allen@enron.com, mike.grigsby@enron.com, heizenrader@home.com,mark.tawney@enron.com, claudio.ribeiro@enron.com, rob.milnthorp@enron.com
Date:Fri, 23 Feb 2001 14:22:00 -0800 (PST)


1.=09Bankruptcy An Increasingly Attractive Option for Davis

Despite the fact that the lights are on and the snowpack is approaching nor=
mal levels after a month of torrential storms, back at the poker table in S=
acramento the situation continues to drift toward bankruptcy. Indeed, almos=
t any reading of Governor Gray Davis's political situation after the shock =
LA Federal Court ruling makes forcing the utilities into bankruptcy his bes=
t bet. At least one of the three major power generators (PG&E) seems to agr=
ee that bankruptcy is better than cutting the deal on the table now, partic=
ularly after yesterday's FERC ruling that it is okay for the company to shi=
ft assets around to protect them in case of bankruptcy.=20

2.=09Davis Wants To Keep Hope Alive Until Analyst Meetings Next Week

Today is crucial in determining the exact odds of a bankruptcy since Davis =
wants to cut a deal if possible before heading off to lead the National Gov=
ernor's Association and meet with Wall Street analysts Tuesday and Wednesda=
y. In fact, Davis's desire to have something definitive to say next week is=
the only reason to believe that bankruptcy can be avoided in California. A=
ccording to talks with all sides, Davis has offered to buy the electricity =
grid from the three largest power producers (PG&E, SoCal Edison and San Die=
go) for something like $7 billion that they could use to pay off most of th=
e money they owe to suppliers and creditors outside their own corporate she=
lls.=20

But the questions is why the utilities would want the deal that appears to =
be on offer and that leaves many people on both sides of the table wonderin=
g whether Davis actually wants a deal or an excuse to get back to a situati=
on where he has court-ordered cover to raise electricity rates that he know=
s are necessary, but politically difficult. According to key Sacramento off=
icials, "Confidence continues to wane in Davis' ability to do this. The pla=
in fact is the stick he's carrying isn't awfully big." Adds another: "The k=
ey people here just think the utilities are playing him. Either they're pla=
ying him, or he's going to roll on the price, he's going to pay double what=
the transmission assets are worth. The utilities got away with the same ki=
nd of thing before, in 1996 of course." Davis is more astute than that, and=
a bankruptcy judge could yet be the political cover for a resolution that =
has been lacking since the utilities lost their court case in Los Angeles.=
=20

3.=09Little Support for Transmission Assets Deal

The transmission assets deal doesn't look attractive for anyone.=20
Davis has no particular affinity for it, having adopted State Senator Burto=
n's proposal when his own preferred equity warrants idea began to fade.=20
The legislature is wary of more state involvement in the power industry, an=
d concerned about the vast investment needed in the network.=20
The utilities -- PG&E in particular don't want to sell.

4.=09Accounting Ambiguities Appear; State Offers Only Tepid Support for Bon=
d Scheme

"There are also more and more issues quietly emerging about utility account=
ing methods which the audits didn't pick up" says one California official. =
"The way they calculate depreciation is very strange. If the accounts were =
done on a proper GAAP basis instead of some kind of FERC basis they would l=
ook different." Even if the deal goes through, the financing could be diffi=
cult and very expensive. The state has definitively ruled out putting the f=
ull faith and credit of the state of California behind the proposed bonds. =
State Treasurer Angelides has also been informed it is unlikely they'd qual=
ify for tax-exempt status.=20

5.=09Small IPP Players Furious

And while the big players talk, there is increasing nervousness among small=
independent and alternative generators. The small companies have been the =
biggest losers so far -- their representative, Jan Smutny-Jones, was tossed=
off the Board of the California ISO, and the closing of the California PX =
deprives them of the main marketing channel for their power. The CEOs of la=
rge companies like Dynegy and Reliant are talking to Davis on a daily basis=
, but the small companies are out of the loop. They also lack the financial=
resources and diversity of income streams to resist problems for long. Lar=
ge companies and the major bank creditors are also aware of the potential p=
olitical and relationship risks across the US if they get cast in the role =
of villain in California. For the small companies, however, it is a matter =
of survival. Some legislators in Sacramento are operating under the assumpt=
ion that it would take a creditor committee of the large generators to forc=
e bankruptcy. Not so. All it takes is three creditors owed at least $11,000=
each to apply for bankruptcy. Two small companies, Cal Energy and Ridgewoo=
d Power, are already resorting to the courts to try to press for payment.=
=20

If bankruptcy is triggered, there is immense uncertainty about what would h=
appen. No major player we talk to is confident they can predict the outcome=
, especially after the shock of Judge Lew's unexpected ruling in Los Angele=
s. It is likely that the issues would have to be decided ultimately by the =
State Supreme Court. FERC and the Federal government could also be ensnared=
as writs fly. But to many of the players, that uncertain mess following ba=
nkruptcy looks better than certain loss in a bad deal.