Enron Mail

From:garrick.hill@enron.com
To:dharvin@velaw.com
Subject:BRAZOS - PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL
Cc:dan.lyons@enron.com, carl.tricoli@enron.com, richard.sanders@enron.com,tmoore@llgm.com, kstern@velaw.com, john.king@enron.com
Bcc:dan.lyons@enron.com, carl.tricoli@enron.com, richard.sanders@enron.com,tmoore@llgm.com, kstern@velaw.com, john.king@enron.com
Date:Wed, 8 Nov 2000 04:57:00 -0800 (PST)

Further to the information feedback provided to you below:

Item 3.

I've updated page 2 of the attached to illustrate pricing that was presented
to Brazos and its advisor (Merril Lynch) during the period of time leading up
to the PPA's signing on November 1, 1993. You'll see that actual results to
date have been in line with were costs were expected to be under the contract.

We have a one page document that appears to be part of a larger Brazos
document that indicates that Brazos looked at 10 competing alternatives to
the Tenaska IV plant (including one Enron alternative). The document is
date-stamped December 28, 1993 and may be part of an "integrated resource
plan" or another regulatory filing required in the State of Texas. Robin
Kittel in our Austin, TX office is looking into its source and is trying to
find any other regulatory filings in which Brazos represented that it viewed
Tenaska IV as its "least cost alternative" at the point in time it entered
into the contract. I don't expect we'll have this information prior to
Friday.

These points aside, there is nothing in the contract that ties pricing or
performance to returns realized by Tenaska IV. The issue of "fairness" is
one that Brazos seems to be emotionally attached to without basis under the
contract.

One item to note in the "fraudulent inducement" arena, the last commercial
exchanges made between Tenaska IV and Brazos prior to the June 30 transaction
indicate that Brazos may have raised some concerns over "incentives" that may
have been provided to the Brazos staff closest to the transaction. After
discussions with Tenaska, Inc. and review of the facilitation material, we've
identified the source of these concerns to be a dove hunting trip that was
planned during the summer of 1993 and taken November 9 through 11, 1993, just
after the PPA's signing. The point person for Brazos and Tenaska's CEO, lead
developer and another Tenaska employee took the trip with their spouses.

Rick Hill
Generation Investments Group




---------------------- Forwarded by Garrick Hill/HOU/ECT on 11/08/2000 12:12
PM ---------------------------

Enron North America Corp.

From: Garrick Hill 11/07/2000 06:01 PM


To: dharvin@velaw.com
cc: Dan Lyons/HOU/ECT@ECT, Carl Tricoli/Corp/Enron@Enron, Richard B
Sanders/HOU/ECT@ECT, tmoore@llgm.com, kstern@velaw.com, John King/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: BRAZOS - PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL

Some initial reactions to your questions...

The implied enterprise value at June 30 based on PPE/ENA's net purchase price
and outstanding project-level debt was $1,457/kW; this value reflects
fully-contracted cash flow under the terms of the existing PPA. As a pure
merchant plant, the value might range from $50/kW (i.e., the "scrap value"
based on a view that the margins realized from running the plant are
insufficient to warrant keeping the doors open) to $350/kW (based on a view
that the plant runs 7x24 and achieves prices at levels forecasted by Pace
Global Energy (Pace) in a study that we had completed to facilitate
commercial discussions with Brazos earlier this year).

The attached slide will give you a feel for where PPA prices are relative to
market prices, again using Pace's numbers to illustrate "market". ENA's
ERCOT 7x24 curve is probably higher at the front end and lower on the back
end than what we see from Pace, reflecting (1) at the front end, what we're
seeing in today's gas forward markets (i.e., higher prices than Pace predicts
from an "econometrics" point of view) and (2) at the back end, lower overall
inflation. In general, I think it's safe to say that we see the spread
between PPA and market prices widening, especially in light of the fact that
current gas market conditions narrow the spread considerably during the
period of time in which a Brazos breach is most likely.

Based on the facilitation material we've seen, it appears that Brazos will
argue that its staff was lead to believe that Tenaska IV would earn no more
than 20% return on equity. However, we've always viewed this as a somewhat
disingenuous line of argument because Brazos has gone on public record as
saying that it looked at a number of competing solutions to meet its members'
needs and chose the least cost alternative in contracting with Tenaska IV.
In fact, the all-in price projections we've seen in correspondence between
Tenaska IV and Brazos in the contracting process appear to be in line with
actual results. To the extent the project has earned a return in excess of
20%, this can generally be attributed to the cost savings realized in
construction and strict enforcement of the contract. It's also important to
note that Tenaska IV took on all of the development risk in this project; it
could have easily underbudgeted costs and found itself earning significantly
less.

See the historical perspective that follows the forward projections contained
in the attached. We generally agree that Brazos has not been harmed by the
current contract to date, but is in an above-market contract on a going
forward basis.

Brazos appears to have three options at the end of the primary term (1) walk
away, (2) purchase the plant for PV5 of future capacity payments, or (3) live
with the contract by paying scheduled contract prices (i.e., capacity charges
and gas agency fees) plus operating costs. If Brazos selects options (2) or
(3), Tenaska IV has certain "put-back" rights, but the plant is generally
Brazos' for the taking. These provisions of the PPA should yield prices that
are below prevailing market prices in most years (i.e., other than those in
which major maintenance will occur) as illustrated in the attached.
Accordingly, we view the contract as more of an "accelerated payment plant"
that front end loads capital recovery to Tenaska IV. Patton Boggs' argument
puts a new "spin" on the contract structure, one that we've not heard up to
this point.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me at
713-853-6027.

Rick Hill
Generation Investments Group





---------------------- Forwarded by Garrick Hill/HOU/ECT on 11/07/2000 03:01
PM ---------------------------


Dan Lyons
11/07/2000 11:00 AM
To: Garrick Hill/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Brazos

More Grist
----- Forwarded by Dan Lyons/HOU/ECT on 11/07/2000 10:59 AM -----

"Harvin, David" <dharvin@velaw.com<
11/06/2000 02:58 PM

To: "Lyons, Dan (Enron)" <dan.lyons@enron.com<, "Richard Sanders (E-mail)"
<richard.b.sanders@enron.com<
cc: "Stern, Karl" <kstern@velaw.com<, "Thomas J. Moore (E-mail)"
<TMOORE@LLGM.COM<
Subject: Brazos


There are some factual assertions in Brazos' memo that caught my eye. I
wondered what information we have on these points:

1) at the bottom of p. 2 is a reference to a March 10, 1994 memo in which
someone claimed Tenaska planned to develop this site irrespective of Brazos.
The suggestion is that Tenaska would have an adequate remedy by selling
power elsewhere. What is our reaction to that?

2) at the bottom of p. 5 is an assertion that we must be predicting that the
difference between market and contract prices will increase over time. Is
that our position? If we apply a contract v. market measure, I know we seek
to base the contract portion on the escalated contract prices, but what do
we use for market? (Their piece of course does not address what is the
market.)

3) in the middle of p. 6 is the claim that representations were made to
Brazos that Tenaska would earn a modest profit under the PPA. Do we know
what that refers to?

4) at the bottom of p. 6 is a statement that under present market conditions
Brazos cannot even exercise this buyout option (presumably because its
payments under the PPA do not cause Brazos to be non-competitive). That is
interesting. If so, what is Brazos's complaint?

5) at the bottom of p. 7 is a claim that the option period was designed as
an alternative to Brazos's owning the plant at the end of the primary term.
What do we know about that? What would be the effect of the pricing in the
renewal term?


++++++CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE+++++
The information in this email may be confidential and/or privileged. This
email is intended to be reviewed by only the individual or organization
named above. If you are not the intended recipient or an authorized
representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
review, dissemination or copying of this email and its attachments, if any,
or the information contained herein is prohibited. If you have received
this email in error, please immediately notify the sender by return email
and delete this email from your system. Thank You