Enron Mail

From:martin.rosell@enron.com
To:alan.aronowitz@enron.com, jeffrey.hodge@enron.com, justin.boyd@enron.com,mark.taylor@enron.com, mark.haedicke@enron.com, mark.elliott@enron.com, mark.evans@enron.com, martin.rosell@enron.com, paul.simons@enron.com, robert.quick@enron.com, scott.seft
Subject:Deliberations of the Norwegian Commodity Derivatives Committee
Cc:
Bcc:
Date:Mon, 4 Oct 1999 06:01:00 -0700 (PDT)

FYI
---------------------- Forwarded by Martin Rosell/OSL/ECT on 04/10/99 11:59
---------------------------


Martin Rosell
04/10/99 12:59
To: Magnus Groth/OSL/ECT@ECT, Brynjar Wiersholm/OSL/ECT@ECT, Jan-Erland
Bekeng/OSL/ECT@ECT, Didrik Thrane-Nielsen/OSL/ECT@ECT, Frank
Overli/OSL/ECT@ECT, Morten E Pettersen/OSL/ECT@ECT, Bjarne
Schieldrop/OSL/ECT@ECT
cc: Matthew Landy/LON/ECT@ECT, Tomas Valnek/LON/ECT@ECT
Subject: Deliberations of the Norwegian Commodity Derivatives Committee

Please find attached a summary in English of the deliberations of the above
Committee (Section 1.4 of its report). Currently, dealing in or otherwise
offering investment services related to commodity derivatives is unregulated
in Norway. From the report released by the Committee, it should be noted
that it:

(1) proposes to make market making and dealing in, and portfolio management
services relating to, commodity derivatives subject to (i) the licensing
requirements set forth in the Norwegian Securities Trading Act
(Verdipapirloven) (the "Act") and (ii) the supervision of the Norwegian
Credit Supervision (Kredittillsynet) (the "Supervision");

(2) proposes that entities engaged or anticipating to engage in the
marketing of investment services in Norway solely relating to commodity
derivatives (and no other financial instruments) - referred to as "commodity
derivatives companies" (verdipapirforetak) by the Commission - are to apply
for a limited licence for that particular activity;

(3) points out that an ISD licence may not be relied upon by entities that
desire to market investment services in Norway relating to commodity
derivatives;

(4) proposes that the dealing in commodity derivatives in Norway is to be
carried out from a Norwegian public or private limited liability company
unless carried out from an EU/EEA entity (non-EU/EEA entities (such as
ECTRIC) will have to apply for a special governmental permit);

(5) proposes that the provisions of the Act are to be made generally
applicable to investment services in Norway relating to commodity derivatives
(unless otherwise is specified in the Act);

(6) proposes to expand the close-out netting provisions of the Act to also
cover positions in commodity derivatives; and

(7) holds that the provisions of CAD I (as implemented) and CAD II (to be
implemented) should not automatically be made applicable to (non-ISD)
commodity derivatives firms but that the Supervision should be given a
mandate to impose the said provisions on individual entities.

The legal technique proposed by the Commission to accomplish the foregoing is
an expansion of the definition of "financial instrument" in the Act to also
include commodity derivatives (whereby the Act will become generally
applicable to commodity derivatives operations). It should be noted,
however, that the Commission suggests that only cash- or physically-settled
future and option contracts in commodities which are "marketable" in nature
should be deemed "financial instruments" under the Act. The Commission sets
out a few criteria to determine when a commodity derivative should be
considered marketable, Among other things, the Commission points out that
the fact that a derivative contract is not freely transferable should not by
itself be determinative in this respect. Instead, it holds that standardised
instruments and instruments traded on a market place should be viewed as
marketable; as should also cash-settled commodity derivatives while contracts
intended to lead to a physical settlement should not. In my view, this
unnecessary complicated approach may lead to difficulties in determining
whether a particular commodity derivative falls within or outside of the
scope of the regulations proposed by the Committee. Most importantly, it may
serve to offer a bankruptcy trustee a needless opening to question whether
derivatives, for which there exist no liquid market (longer-term deals,
temperature deals, etc.), should be made part of any close-out netting
arrangement.

Lastly, it should be stressed that the Commission's report is not a bill
presented to Parliament. Whether it'll lead to legislation remains to be
seen. The position will be monitored.

Martin